Topics in Intellectual Property by Malaspina, Peter
TOPICS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Peter Adam Malaspina
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill in partial fulllment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
the Department of Economics.
Chapel Hill
2011
Approved by,
Peter Norman
Gary Biglaiser
Helen Tauchen
Sergio Parreiras
Brian McManus
ABSTRACT
Peter Malaspina: Topics in Intellectual Property
(Under the instruction of Dr. Peter Norman)
The following chapters cover theoretical and empirical investigations into issues of
intellectual property.
The rst chapter examines predatory behavior in patent litigation. I develop a signal-
ing model where the timing of litigation against an initial act of infringement transmits
noisy signals about a patent holders private expectations of litigation awards. I nd a
non-monotonic relationship between a patent holders award expectation and the tim-
ing of litigation. Patent holders with su¢ ciently high award expectations will exhibit
predatory behavior by delaying litigation to lure infringers. At the same time, patent
holders with moderate award expectations will litigate quickly to deter additional acts
of infringement.
The second chapter (co-authored with Dr. David Molin) examines the economic
consequences of the reduction in the xed costs of distribution due to the emergence
of Internet and information technology. Others have examined the e¤ects of increasing
product variety on consumer welfare, in bookselling and in other markets. We identify a
set of books sold on Amazon.com for which the authors revenue can be easily computed.
We use this data to parameterize a model of author entry and then estimate the welfare
gains of authors and consumers from Print-on-Demand (POD) technology.
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CHAPTER 1
PREDATORY DELAYS IN PATENT LITIGATION
1.1 Introduction
In 2007 a jury awarded the plainti¤ Alcatel-Lucent $1.5 billion for the violation of two
patents by the defendant Microsoft, who allegedly used unlicensed audio technology in
their Windows operating systems beginning in 1997. After siding with Alcatel-Lucent,
the court based their award on 0.5% of the retail value of all the computers sold with
the unlicensed technology. Furthermore, Alcatel-Lucent waited until after the release of
Windows XP in 2001 to pursue litigation in 2002, well after the rst unlicensed use of
the patented technology in 1997. So the question remains: why did Alcatel-Lucent wait
so long to initiate litigation?
One theory is that Alcatel-Lucent had an incentive to delay litigation until after
Microsoft committed a subsequent act of infringement with the release of Windows XP.
Alcatel-Lucent may have foreseen the potential for a larger award in the future by noting
that sales were accumulating during the delay, and that these sales would probably be
used to calculate awards. Therefore, if Alcatel-Lucent had initiated litigation based
on earlier versions of Windows, Microsoft may have avoided incorporating the patented
technology into future products altogether, and thus eliminated the potential for Alcatel-
Lucent to extract any royalty for subsequent use.
The example above suggests that a patent holders award expectation may a¤ect the
timing of litigation when there is a potential for additional infringement in the future.
In this paper, I model how this process works and analyze its impact on the behavior of
patent holders and infringers. To this end, I develop a signaling model where the timing
of litigation against an act of infringement transmits information about a patent holders
private expectations of litigation awards.
In the analysis of my model I nd many cases where patent holder behavior is im-
pacted by two reputation e¤ects: deterrence and luring. Patent holders with su¢ ciently
high award expectations will utilize luring by delaying litigation to encourage additional
acts of infringement.1 Patent holders with relatively moderate award expectations will
utilize deterrence by litigating quickly before additional acts of infringement can be com-
mitted. Last, patent holders with the lowest award expectations will create no litigation.
Therefore, the probability of litigation preempting any additional infringement is increas-
ing in the patent holders award expectation up to a point, after which the probability
of preemptive litigation is decreasing until it reaches zero.2
The incentives for predatory patent holder behavior exist under the following condi-
tions: First, at least one patent holder type must expect litigation in face of infringement
to return greater expected prots than the best alternative in the absence of infringe-
ment. Second, the infringers equilibrium entry decision must be conditioned on their
observations of any previous litigation.3 Together, these conditions will imply that there
exists at least one type of patent holder that has an incentive to delay litigation for the
sake of predation.
I show that there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium for each parameter
setting of the model. The existence property of the model, combined with the intuitive
nature of resulting equilibrium, demonstrates the models ability to provide insightful
results for a wide range of settings. Furthermore, the uniqueness property shows that my
conclusions are unbiased with respect to the equilibrium I choose to analyze. Uniqueness
is a useful property for models with reputation, which usually result in multiple equilibria,
1Litigation Awards can be up to three times damages plus legal costs. Furthermore, since awards for
patent infringement cannot fall below the courts denition of a "reasonable royalty", a patent holder
who is condent in the validly of his patent, as well as his ability to prove infringement, should view an
expected licensing fee as an approximate baseline for awards.
2In our model, a patent holder that desires deterrence is analogous to a "weak" incumbent acting
"tough" in the classic entrant incumbent game modeled in Kreps and Wilson(1982). However the
potential incentives for luring provide a new twist on an old game. That is, we also see tough types
acting weak.
3In some cases the infringer will ignore the rst round signal. For example, when no patent holder
type has a positive award expectation, the infringer will commit additional infringement regardless of
the observed signal, because no feasible posterior beliefs could deter an infringer from entry. In this case
the infringers equilibrium entry decision is unconditional.
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of which at least some are una¤ected by reputation.
The predatory behavior found in my model is not necessarily prohibited under current
U.S. patent law. The current statute of limitations requires that litigation be brought
within 6 years of an initial act of infringement.4 In many cases, opportunities for the
infringer to commit additional acts of infringement exist well within this time frame.5
However, I show that policy makers can a¤ect the magnitude of reputational distortions
without changing the statute of limitations. To this end, I demonstrate how the mag-
nitude of reputations e¤ect on behavior is linked to the prior distribution of expected
awards, noting that policy makers have some control over these distributions.
My research is related to other work that focuses on the strategic behavior of patent
holders in the face of potential infringement. Crampes and Langinier (2002) model patent
holders who must expend e¤ort to monitor for infringement. They calculate the optimal
e¤ort level, and nd that increasing awards may not necessarily decrease the probability
of infringement. I include a similar notion of patent holder e¤ort. Michael J. Meurer
(1989) models the nature of settlement o¤ers to a potential infringer. Meurer analyzes
how a patent holders private expectations of their patents validity can lead to a par-
ticular settlement, litigation, or inaction outcome. My model also assumes that patent
holders have private information about their patent. However, I expand on Meurers
notion of private information by including any element of private information that af-
fects expected awards. Certainly, information about validity will a¤ect a patent holders
expected award. Therefore, my interpretation of private information includes, but is not
limited to, issues of validity. Neither Crampes and Langinier nor Meurer, considers a
repeated interaction between a patent holder and a sequence of infringers. Therefore,
issues concerning information revelation and reputation e¤ects are not present.
The closest to modeling reputation e¤ects in patent litigation is Choi (1998), who
examines the implications of information transmission on the strategic behavior of an
endogenous sequence of infringers. While there are some similarities in our models,
there are also some important di¤erences: In his model all patent holders are ex-ante
4Pincus(1991)
5Any future production or sales of an infringing product after the initial act of infringement could
constitute an additional act of infringement in the model.
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identical. Therefore, it is impossible to account for the di¤erent reputational incentives
of patent holders who di¤er in their private expectations of litigation awards. Choi also
assumes that information is transmitted the moment litigation begins; whereas in my
model, litigation is ongoing, such that it does not fully reveal private information to
other potential infringers. The distinctions lead us to di¤erent conclusions about why
patent holders might want to delay litigation. Whereas, Choi nds that patent holders
will delay litigation because they are afraid of revealing weakness, I nd that patent
holders may delay litigation to avoid revealing strength.
The rest of this paper is presented in the following order: The second section presents
the model preliminaries, and denes equilibrium strategies and beliefs. The third section
presents the resulting equilibrium properties of the model. The fourth section discusses
the properties of the model as they relate to reputation, potential policy, and signal-
ing games in general. The fth section states my conclusions. The sixth section is an
appendix containing the proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions.
Figure 1: A timeline of the game
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1.2 Model
Consider a two period model where a patent holder faces o¤ against an initial act of
infringement committed at the beginning of period 1.6 Furthermore, the patent holder
foresees the potential of an additional act of infringement in period 2.7 Assume patent
holders have private information about their expected awards from any litigation. In the
resulting signaling game, signals about the patent holders private information will be
transmitted by the outcome of period 1 to the potential infringer before they are called
to make an entry decision in period 2. The timing of this game is summarized in gure
1.
Assume patent holders vary in their ex-ante expected awards from any ongoing liti-
gation that has been successfully initiated, such that awards are correlated with private
information  for each type  2   R.8
Furthermore, let 0 () denote the infringers infringers prior beliefs about the patent
holders private information in period 1. Such that 0 () assigns each type  a prior
probability density, denoted as 0 ().
Let  > 0 be an exogenous scalar that captures the relative size of the potential act
of infringement to the initial act, such that
1. If litigation is initiated successfully against either act separately, the patent holder
would expect award  for the initial act of infringement, and  for the potential
act of infringement.
2. If litigation is initiated successfully against both acts jointly, the expected award
becomes ( + ).
The game begins when a patent holder faces an initial act of infringement in period 1.
6First period infringement is assumed for simplicity. Endogenous rst period entry will not change
the general intuition of our results.
7This model depicts what happens when the potential infringer is the same as the initial infringer
(See the Microsoft example in the introduction). If instead I want to analyze what happens when the
potential infringer is another rm, I can make minor modications to the model that will not a¤ect the
intuition of the results.
8I allow for types  < 0 for generality.  < 0 might be representative of a patent holder with invalid
property rights who might expect a countersuit.
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In order to successfully initiate litigation, the patent holder must expend e¤ort denoted
e1: Based on the patent holders e¤ort, nature determines the the probability p (e1) that
the patent holder successfully nds arguments su¢ cient to bring the case to court in
period 1. I assume e1 2 R+; and p (e1) is twice continuously di¤erentiable such that
p
0
(e1) > 0, p
00
(e1) < 0; and p (0) = 0.9 Therefore, based on his e¤ort, the patent holder
creates litigation in period 1 with probability p (e1) ; with complementary probability
(1  p (e1)) no litigation exists at the beginning of period 2.
Any litigation initiated in period 1 is on-going at the beginning of period two. There-
fore, the only signal observed by the infringer in period 2 is the history h1 2 fL; /Lg,
where fLg denotes the existence, and f /Lg denotes the absence, of ongoing litigation
from period 1.10
Therefore, I denote the infringers period 2 entry action as being conditional on observ-
ing h1. Let 2 (h1) 2 [0; 1] denote the conditional entry probability, as mixed strategies
over fOut; Ing : If the infringer decides not to commit additional acts of infringement,
they pay an exogenous licensing fee F to the patent holder for additional use.11 On the
other hand, if they commit additional acts of infringement, they avoid the licensing fee,
but may be subject to litigation in period 2.
After the potential infringers decision in period two, there are four possible histories
facing a patent holder in period 2, stemming from the two possible histories of period 1
fL; /Lg ; and the two possible actions of the infringer in period 2 fOut; Ing (See Figure
2). Therefore, the expected award for successfully initiated litigation in period 2 will
be conditional on a patent holders type () and the set of observable histories h2 2
fh1; a2(h1)g : Here I summarize the four possible histories and provide the corresponding
9It is important to keep in mind that failure to initiate litigation does not mean that a patent holder
loses in court. In this model, failure to initiate litigation in period 1 is interpreted as a failure to nd
arguments su¢ cient to bring the case to court in period 1.
10I defend the assumption about the observable history as follows: litigation is usually a long process.
Protracted legal battles can delay information transmission beyond the onset of a trial. For example, in
the case of Polaroid V. Kodak, it took 14 years for the patent infringement suit to be resolved. Therefore,
the infringer will likely have other opportunities to commit additional acts of infringement before they
can observe the nal award.
11The implications of an endogenous licensing fee are examined in the discussion section. I show that
with common sense assumptions, allowing for the endogenous licensing will not change the intuition of
the results.
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expected player prots.
Let PH (h2; ) denote a type  patent holders expected prots upon reaching history
h2. Furthermore, let IN (h2 j ) denote the infringers expected prots upon reaching
history h2, conditional on facing a patent holder of type .12 The four potential histories
facing the patent holder in period 2 are dened as follows:
History h2 = fL;Outg : The infringer decides not to commit an additional act of
infringement in the presence of ongoing litigation from period 1. The infringer pays
an exogenous licensing fee (F ) to the patent holder for additional use, and awaits the
outcome of the ongoing litigation from round 1.
PH (L;Out; ) =  + F   e1 (1)
IN (L;Out j ) =     F (2)
12Note that at this point in the game, the infringer will not necessarily know what type of patent
holder it faces. Thus, the infringers equilibrium action will depend on its beliefs. Beliefs are detailed
in section 2.3.
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History h2 = fL; Ing The infringer commits an additional act of infringement in the
presence of ongoing litigation from period 1. The infringer avoids paying the licensing
fee. However, the patent holder can then initiate litigation against the additional act of
infringement separately, with certainty, and without any additional cost of e¤ort.
PH (L; In; ) =  +    e1 (3)
IN (L; In j ) =      (4)
History h2 = f /L; Ing : the infringer commits an additional act of infringement in the
absence of ongoing litigation from period 1. The infringer avoids paying the licensing fee.
However, the patent holder can expend e¤ort (e2) to try and initiate litigation against
both the initial and additional acts of infringement jointly.
PH ( /L; In; ) = ( + ) p (e2 ( j In))  e2( j In)  e1 (5)
IN ( /L; In j ) =   ( + ) p (e2 ( j In)) ; (6)
where e2 ( j In) = argmax
e22R+
f( + ) p (e2)  e2g :
History h2 = f /L;Outg: The infringer decides not to commit an additional act of
infringement in the absence of litigation from period 1. The infringer pays a licensing
fee for additional use of the patent, but the patent holder can still expend e¤ort (e2) to
litigate the initial act of infringement from period one.
PH ( /L;Out; ) = F + p (e2( j Out))  e2( j Out)  e1 (7)
IN ( /L;Out j ) =  F   p (e2 ( j Out)) ; (8)
where e2 ( j Out) = argmax
e22R+
fp (e2)  e2g :
All payo¤s are realized at the end of the second period. I now dene a reduced form of
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of my model.
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Figure 2: An overview of the game.
The reduced form13 of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium will consist of
1. Each patent holder types e¤ort levels: fe1 ()g 8 2 
2. The infringers entry probabilities: 2 (L) ; 

2 ( /L) :
3. The infringers updated beliefs: f ( j L) ;  ( j /L)g.
Such that:
 Given 2 (L) and 2 ( /L), e1 () maximizes the expected prots of each type :
 Given  ( j h1) ; 2 (h1) is prot maximizing for the infringer for all h1 2 fL; /Lg.
 The infringers updated beliefs  ( j h1) are consistent with fe1 ()8  2 g for all
h1 2 fL; /Lg :14
13I omit e2 ( j Out) ; e2 ( j In) from the reduced form because they are una¤ected by beliefs. See (7)
and (5).
14Perfection is satised when there is at least one type of patent holder with positive litigation ex-
pectations because both possible signals will occur with positive probability in equilibrium. In this
case, there will be no o¤ equilibrium histories to generate o¤ equilibrium beliefs. Furthermore, when no
patent holder type has a positive expectation of litigation awards, I can assume that the infringer always
enters in period 2 because no posterior beliefs over the support of initial beliefs could deter additional
infringement.
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Solving for Equilibrium In the signaling game I model the infringer observes a noisy
signal of the patent holders award expectation based on their understanding of each
patent holder types rst period optimization problem. Therefore, while an infringer
does not observe the patent holders rst period e¤ort, they can still update their beliefs
in a manner consistent with the equilibrium e¤ort of the patent holder. This consistency
results in a useful property: that a change in equilibrium entry probability will always
a¤ect the equilibrium e¤ort level of at least one patent holder type. Therefore any
potential change in equilibrium infringer entry probability will change their expected
prots. Therefore, the resulting PBE of the game will always be unique. Thus I prove
that my ndings about predatory behavior generated by the model are general, and not
the result of a selective choice of the equilibria to analyze.
The general procedure for identifying equilibria is guess and verify, which I briey
summarize as follows:
1. Guess a set of infringer best responses
f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g (9)
2. Given f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g ; calculate each type patent holders optimal e¤ort.
fe^1 ()8  2 g = fe1 ( j ^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L))8  2 g (10)
3. Given fe^1 ()8  2 g ; calculate the infringers updated beliefs
^ ( j L) =  ( j L; e^1 ()8  2 ) (11)
^ ( j /L) =  ( j /L; e^1 ()8  2 ) (12)
4. Using updated beliefs, verify that best responses are indeed best responses
^2 (L) = 

2 (L j fe^1 ()8  2 g) (13)
^2 ( /L) = 

2 ( /L j fe^1 ()8  2 g) (14)
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In the following I sections I will describe the relationships between optimal patent
holder e¤ort, the infringers beliefs, and the infringers best responses.
Updating Beliefs
Before making an entry decision in period 2, the infringer will update its beliefs about
the distribution of patent holder types based on the observable outcome of period 1, its
prior beliefs 0 () ; and the set of equilibrium e¤ort levels for each patent holder type
fe1 ()8  2 g. Note that e¤ort is not observable; however, within any equilibrium, I
show below that each patent holder type has a unique optimal amount of e¤ort. There-
fore, fe1 ()8  2 g can be used to update beliefs in equilibrium, because the infringer
will know the optimization problem faced by each patent holder type. Here I dene the
infringers updated beliefs as the set of density functions f ( j h1) 8h1 2 fL; /Lgg :
Denition 1 The infringers updated beliefs, is the mapping
 : f; h1g  ! [0; 1] (15)
such that, upon observing h1
 ( j L) = p (e

1())0 ()R
2
p (e1())0 () d
(16)
 ( j /L) = (1  p (e

1 ()))0 ()R
2
(1  p (e1()))0 () d
(17)
where p (e1 ()) is the probability a type  patent holder creates litigation in period 1 given
its equilibrium rst period e¤ort e1 (), and 0 () is the prior density of a type  in
nature.
The Infringers Entry Decision
There are only two subgames facing the potential infringer stemming from the two ob-
servable outcomes in period one: the existence of litigation, or lack thereof, denoted
respectively as the history h1 2 fL; /Lg. This outcome will allow the infringer to update
11
their beliefs from 0 () to ( j h1). Therefore the potential infringers expected pay-
o¤s from infringement become conditional on the outcome of round 1, and their entry
decision.
To see if the infringer is maximizing prots by choosing fIng in period 2, I must
compare it to their reservation value from choosing fOutg. Note, that an infringers
expected prots from entry and their expected reservation value is conditional on the
observed the rst period outcome. Here I dene their net expected payo¤s from entry
under each observable rst period history. Notice that the infringers expected prots
consist of its expected prots conditioned on patent holder type within the corresponding
second period histories (see (2), (4), (6), and (8)), and the densities assigned by their
updated beliefs.
IN (h1; In) =
Z
2

IN (h1; In j )  IN (h1; Out j )

( j h1)d (18)
I now dene an infringer best response for each observed history form period 1, as a
function of the net expected payo¤s from entry.
Denition 2 The best response for the infringer, given an observed rst period history
h1; is the mapping
2 : fL; /Lg  ! [0; 1] (19)
such that
2 (h1) = 1; if 
IN (h1; In) > 0 (20)
2 (h1) 2 (0; 1) ; if IN (h1; In) = 0
2 (h1) = 0; if 
IN (h1; In) < 0
where 2 (h1) is their probability of committing the additional act of infringement condi-
tional on observing the rst period history h1:
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The Patent Holders Optimization Problem
The patent holders optimization problem depends on the equilibrium best responses of
the infringer to the rst period outcome. Therefore, any set of best responses
f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g will lead to a unique choice of e¤ort(e1( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))) for each patent
holder type  2 : Hence for each patent holder type  2 ;
e1( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L) ) = argmax
e12R+
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p(e1)

2 (L)
PH (L; In; )+
(1  p(e1))2 ( /L)PH ( /L; In; )+
p(e1) (1  2 (L))PH (L;Out; )+
(1  p(e1)) (1  2 ( /L))PH ( /L;Out; )
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
:15 (21)
As I see from the patent holders prot maximization problem above, the patent
holder considers the likelihood of reaching any history given its choice of e¤ort in period
1 and the set of equilibrium infringer best responses f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g. A patent holder
must also consider its expected prots given that it reaches a particular history, given in
(1) (3) (5) and (7).16
The patent holders optimal rst period e¤ort is based on the following rst order
condition. Here I present this condition with respect to e1:
p0 (e1) ()  1; (22)
where  () is dened as
 () =
26664
PH (L;Out; )  PH ( /L;Out; )+
2 (L)

PH (L; In; )  PH (L;Out; )+
2 ( /L)

PH ( /L;Out; )  PH ( /L; In; )
37775 ; (23)
16Note that the patent holders expected prots, given that they reach a particular subgame, are ex-
ante predetermined (as illustrated in descriptions of the period 2 subgames above). Therefore I do not
restate these prot maximizing period two choices of e¤ort here because they are static with respect to
any potential equilibrium.
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and the corresponding second order condition
p00(e1) () < 0: (24)
Notice that a given set of infringer best responses f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g is su¢ cient to identify
the optimal rst period e¤ort for each patent holder type. Notice that the rst order
condition holds with equality for a given set of best responses f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g whenever
 () > 0; because p(e1) is concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable, and thus the
second order condition is also satised. Furthermore, for all types  such that  () 
0; I know e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)) = 0 because the rst order condition will never bind.
Therefore, for a given set of best responses each patent holder type has only one level
of e¤ort that maximizes its expected prots. This property is essential for showing that
any equilibrium is unique.
1.3 Results
In this section, I show that any parameterization of the model, with any distribution of
types   R, and any twice continuously di¤erentiable function p() such that p0(e) > 0;
p00(e) < 0; p(0) = 0; has a unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
First, I prove in Lemma 1 that the patent holders choice of rst period e¤ort is
a continuously di¤erentiable function of the patent holders type ; and the infringers
conditional equilibrium entry probabilities: 2 (L) and 

2 ( /L). This property is reliant
on allowing the patent holders choice of e1 to be continuous. This will allow me to use
the appropriate derivatives in my proofs of the subsequent Lemmas and Propositions.
Lemma 1 For all  2 R; e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)) is continuously di¤erentiable in 2 (L) ;
2 ( /L) ; and :
Next, lemmas 2 and 3 show how a change in the infringers equilibrium conditional
entry probability a¤ects the equilibrium relative rst period e¤ort of each patent holder
type. These lemmas will help me prove lemmas 4 and 5, and assist me in my analysis
patent holder e¤ort in the discussion section.
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Lemma 2 As 2 ( /L) increases, the change in rst period patent holder e¤ort is a weakly
decreasing function of patent holder type ; such that
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 ( /L) @
 0; 8 (25)
Lemma 3 As 2 (L) increases, the change in equilibrium rst period e¤ort is a weakly
increasing function of type :
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 (L) @
 0; 8 (26)
Next, in lemmas 4 and 5 I show how a change in the infringers equilibrium conditional
entry probability (either 2 (L) or 

2 ( /L)) a¤ects its expected prots from entry after
any rst period history (h1), via its a¤ect on equilibrium patent holder e¤ort shown in
Lemmas 2 and 3. Lemmas 4, and 5 are necessary conditions to prove uniqueness and
existence of equilibria in my model.
Lemma 4 The infringers expected prots from entry, after observing the existence of
litigation in period 1 (h1 = L) ; is
(4.1) monotonically increasing in 2 ( /L)
(4.2) monotonically decreasing in 2 (L)
Lemma 5 The infringers expected prots from entry after observing the absence of lit-
igation (h1 = /L) in period 1, is
(5.1) monotonically decreasing in 2 ( /L)
(5.2) monotonically increasing in 2 (L).
Next, Lemma 6 will show how the probability of the infringer committing additional
acts of infringement must be greater under the absence of litigation than it is under the
existence of litigation. This assures me that in all equilibria the existence of litigation
will cause more deterrence than the absence of litigation.
Lemma 6 In any Bayesian equilibrium 2 (L) > 0 only if 

2 ( /L) = 1:
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I now present Proposition 1, which summarizes the existence and uniqueness proper-
ties of equilibria in the model. It states that for any setting of the model there will exist
one, and only one equilibrium.
Proposition 1 For any setting of the parameters and any continuous function p () un-
der my assumptions, and for any possible prior beliefs 0 () and any type space   R;
there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The existence property of the model is proven by construction in the appendix. The
proof of existence is outlined as follows: I begin by showing the procedure for checking
for equilibrium in pure strategy infringer best responses using the method outlined in
(14)-(19).
f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g 2 ffOut;Outg ; fOut; Ing ; fIn; Ingg ;
When there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, I use the following Lemmas, to show
that there must be an equilibrium in mixed entry strategies. In other words, if
f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g 62 ffOut;Outg ; fOut; Ing ; fIn; Ingg (27)
then
f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g 2 fOut; 2g or f2; Ing (28)
where 2 2 (0; 1) :
The uniqueness property of equilibrium in my model is derived from Lemmas 4
and 5; because even when the infringer is indi¤erent to entry under a certain history,
and therefore playing a equilibrium mixed entry strategy 2 (h1) ; deviating and play-
ing ~2 (h1) 6= 2 (h1) will disrupt the equilibria by changing the equilibrium rst period
patent holder e¤orts, which will in turn a¤ect the infringers expected prots from entry
under any history.
For example, suppose infringer responses f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g =

Out; 1
2
	
are in equilibrium:
From 2 ( /L) =
1
2
; I know his expected prots from entry given 2 ( /L) =
1
2
; after ob-
serving f /Lg are zero. Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, if the infringer tries to enter with
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lower probability
 
^2 ( /L) <
1
2

upon observing f /Lg ; his expected prot from entry upon
observing /L will become positive; thus forcing ^2 ( /L) = 1; contradicting my supposi-
tion that
 
^2 ( /L) <
1
2

: Furthermore, if the infringer tries enter with higher probability 
^2 ( /L) >
1
2

then by Lemma 5.1, his expected prots from entry upon observing /L will
become negative, thus forcing ^2 ( /L) = 0; thereby contradicting my supposition that
^2 ( /L) >
1
2
:
By Lemma 6 I know that the only remaining potential alternative equilibria can lie in
ff^2 (L) ; 1g j ^2 (L) > 0g : However I have already shown that f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = f0; 1g
will cause the infringer to expect negative prots from entry upon observing f /Lg : There-
fore by Lemma 6 I know that the infringers expected prots from entry upon observing
fLg must also be weakly negative when f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = f0; 1g : Furthermore, by
Lemma 4.2 the infringers expected prots from entry, conditional on observing fLg are
continuously decreasing in ^2 (L) : Therefore there can be no alternative equilibrium such
that ^2 (L) > 0: Thus I have shown that if f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g =

Out; 1
2
	
is an equilibrium,
there can be no other equilibrium f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g 6= f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g :
Infringer Best Response Properties
In any equilibrium, the existence of litigation in period 1 will weakly decrease the like-
lihood of infringement in period 2. This property exists because litigation is positively
correlated with the patent holders private expectation of the likely award in period 2,
and thus negatively correlated with the infringers expected prots from additional in-
fringement. This notion is formalized in Corollary 1 which stems directly from Lemma
6.
Corollary 1 In any Bayesian equilibrium 2 ( /L)  2 (L) :
From Corollary 1, I see that litigation must always be a signal that causes deterrence
(2 (L) < 

2 ( /L)). Imagine if I assumed instead that 

2 (L) > 

2 ( /L) : In this case, litiga-
tion would be more likely to encourage entry than the absence of litigation, implying that
patent holders optimal rst period e¤ort would all be monotonically increasing in their
type. As a result, this would imply necessarily that
R
[( j L)] d > R [( j /L)] d:
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Figure 3: The the resulting class of equilibrium.
This in turn would cause the infringers expected prot from entry under existing litiga-
tion (24) to be less than its expected prots under the absence of litigation (23), which
contradicts the hypothetical 2 (L) > 

2 ( /L) :
Here I classify equilibria in terms of the entry behavior of potential infringers. This
classication system will aid me in the discussion of my results. Thus an infringers
second period behavior within a Class (i) setting is:
(I): always chooses fOutg.
(II): chooses fOutg when observing fLg and mixes over fIn;Outg when observing
f /Lg.
(III): chooses fOutg when observing fLg and chooses fIng when observing f /Lg :
(IV): mixes over fIn;Outg when observing fLg, and chooses fIng when observing f /Lg :
(V): always chooses fIng :
The Existence of Reputational E¤ects
In this section, I determine the regions of the parameter space where I nd reputation
e¤ects. Furthermore, I show that these e¤ects exist whenever the potential infringers
entry behavior is a¤ected by the rst period outcome. To this end I dene what I
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refer to as a reputational equilibrium. This will allow me to focus on equilibria where
reputations are a factor. After all, any equilibrium where the infringers period 2 entry
action is una¤ected by the rst period history is trivial in terms of any reputation e¤ects,
because the infringers entry behavior is una¤ected by any signal it receives.
Denition 3 A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in my model is a reputational equilibrium
if
f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g =2 ffOut;Outg ; fIn; Ingg :
Here I state the following proposition to show that reputational equilibria exist within a
non-empty region of the parameter space.
Proposition 2 There exists a non-empty region of the parameter space, prior beliefs
0 () ; and type spaces   R; such that the equilibrium is reputational.
From the proof of Proposition 2 (in the Appendix), I show that the equilibrium will
depend on the size of ex-ante expected awards EIN0 [] =
R
2
0 () d relative to the size
exogenous licensing fee F . Consider Figure 3. Here I demonstrate that the existence
of non trivial equilibria (Regions II,III,IV) relies on the ex-ante expected award being
neither too large in comparison to the licensing fee (Region I), nor too small (Region V).
The Properties of Optimal E¤ort
In this section I uncover the relationship between the incentives for reputational e¤ects
and a patent holders rst period e¤ort. To this end, I use Propositions 4 and 5 to show
the thresholds in the space of private information where one e¤ect (deterrence or luring)
begins to dominate the other.
Proposition 3 In any reputational equilibrium, there exists  2 R such that rst period
e¤ort is
(3.1) increasing in ; if and only if  < 
(3.2) decreasing in ; if and only if  > :
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Figure 4: Optimal patent holder e¤ort in a reputational equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In any reputational equilibrium, there exists  2 R and 2 R such that
(4.1) e1() = 0; if  < 
(4.2) e1() = 0; if  > .
Propositions 3 and 4 give me thresholds in the patent holder type space. These
thresholds (; , and ) are used in Figure 4 to compare each patent holder types rst
period e¤ort. I see here that rst period e¤ort is non-monotonic in type. This property
occurs because, for all types  greater than ; the benets of deterrence are diminishing,
relative to the benets of luring, as I increase :
Note that for all patent holder types  2
h
; 
i
, the patent holder is still choosing
positive e¤ort levels in period 1. Therefore, if a patent holder of this type succeeds in
initiating litigation in period 1, they will still go to trial. Furthermore, all patent holder
types    are expending zero e¤ort in period 1, even though they have the highest
award expectations, because they do not want to deter entry under in period 2 under
any circumstance. This behavior may be characteristic of what Herald (2008) refers to as
a Patent Troll: A patent holder that relies on litigation to extract revenue from potential
licensors, who obscures their own property rights to encourage infringers.17
17An endeavor to nd observable statistics that identify potential patent trolls post litigation merits
consideration.
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Figure 5: Changing beliefs in an example setting that results in a reputational equilib-
rium.
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Corollary 2 The probability that litigation occurs in period 1, is weakly increasing in ;
if and only if  < :
Corollary 2 is a direct result of Proposition 2 and corollary 1. When a patent holder is
beneting from the deterrence e¤ect, increasing its expected award makes it more likely
that he will create litigation in period 1. On the other hand, when a patent holder is
benetting from the luring e¤ect, increasing its expected award makes it less likely that
he will create litigation in period 1. This non-monotonic property is illustrated by the
optimal e¤ort depicted in Figure 4. Note that some patent holders are so interested in
luring the potential infringer, that the probability that they create rst period litigation
is zero (types  > ).
Consider gure 5. This gure shows the change in beliefs, for each rst period history,
with respect to the thresholds dened in Propositions 3 and 4. I show in Figure 5 that
settings exist where the absence of litigation from period 1 causes the infringer to enter,
even when it assigns a higher probability density to some patent holder types with the
highest award expectations.18 At the same time, the existence of litigation will deter
entry, even though the probability of patent holder having the highest award expectation
goes to zero, because all patent holder types greater than  will never create litigation in
period 1.
Corollary 3 The magnitude of reputations e¤ect on patent holder e¤ort is
(C3.1) increasing as 2 ( /L)! 1
(C3.2) decreasing as 2 (L)! 1
In any trivial equilibrium, the infringers entry action is unconditional; therefore,
patent holders can not benet from either deterrence or luring e¤ects, because the in-
fringers action is una¤ected by the signal they observe. Thus, I can analyze how the
conditionality of the infringers entry decision a¤ects the patent holders incentives to
deceive, by observing the relative changes in patent holder e¤ort as the equilibrium in-
fringer responses move from f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g = fOut; Ing (the dotted line in Figure 6)
18This e¤ect on beliefs is analogous to a poker game, where a player passes on the opportunity to raise
the pot. Opposing players might assign a higher probability to them having a weak hand, and at the
same time assign higher probability to having a really strong hand.
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Figure 6: Reputations e¤ect on patent holder e¤ort.
to f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g = fOut;Outg (the solid line in Figure 6), which could be caused by
a decrease in the licensing fee. The relative changes in patent holder e¤ort are a result
of Lemma 3, which shows the change in patent holder e¤ort across types, for an increase
in 2 ( /L) :
As illustrated in Figure 6, when moving from a conditional entry equilibrium (Class
III) to an unconditional entry equilibrium (Class I), the optimal e¤ort in period 1 becomes
steadily increasing in type, because no type wants to expend more or less e¤ort for the
sake of any reputation e¤ect. Furthermore, I observe that for all types greater than ,
patent holders are spending less e¤ort when infringers entry decision is conditional, than
if it were unconditional. These types are doing so because the benets from luring are
outweighing the benets from deterrence. At the same time, I observe that below  in the
type space, patent holders are spending more e¤ort. These types are doing so because
the benets from deterrence are outweighing the benets from luring.
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1.4 Discussion
Implications of Award Distributions The existence reputational equilibria depends
on both the expected award from litigation EIN0 [] =
R
2 0 () d and the variance
of the expected award. Distributions, with relatively low means (EIN0 []) and long and
thin upper tails create the ideal setting for predatory behavior because most patent
holder types will try and create deterrence. In these settings, the absence of litigation
in period 1 will be very enticing to a potential infringer. Thus, predatory patent holders
will be able to use the luring e¤ect to good advantage, by delaying litigation. On the
other hand, consider a distribution with two symmetrically distributed types: a patent
holder type with extremely large award expectations and those who expect zero awards
from litigation. In this setting, patent holders with extremely large award expectations
are e¤ectively unable to use the luring e¤ect, because the there is no one else for the
zero expectation patent holders to pool with (to create deterrence by imitation). For
this reason, when there are only two types, I know that the rst period e¤ort of the
low expectation type must be less than the rst period e¤ort of the high expectation
type. This type of setting will usually result in equilibria with minimal opportunities for
deterrence and luring (either Class II or Class IV depending on the prior density of the
two types).
I have shown that for any nontrivial equilibrium that there exists a type  2 R
such that for all  > , @e

1()
@
< 0: However to show that  2 ; requires more specic
assumptions about the distribution. For example, under certain parameter settings it is
possible that the patent holder with the largest award expectation is threatening to a
potential infringer, but doesnt want to encourage entry. In these cases, I see reputational
behavior analogous to the ndings in Kreps andWilson (1981), where every patent holder
has some incentive to create deterrence.
Policy
A policy maker might wish to control the impact of reputation in patent litigation.
Furthermore, I have shown how these incentives are linked to the distributions of awards.
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Therefore, since policy makers can a¤ect the distribution through the average size of
potential awards and the requirements for recovering those awards, I conclude they have
some control over reputational behavior.
For example, allowing for awards in excess of 3 times damages in special circumstances
might stretch out the upper tail of an existing distribution of expected awards. From
Proposition 3 I know that this will weakly increase the likelihood of predatory behavior
(Luring). On the other hand, relaxing the requirements for receiving modest awards may
shift the bottom part of the distribution towards the middle. From corollary 3 I see
that this will weakly decrease the amount of anti-competitive behavior (Using deterrence
when perfect information about the patent holders property rights would lead to entry).
In general, vagueness about a patent holders property rights will broaden the distri-
bution of possible expected awards. In this sense, the reputational distortions present in
my model may represent a cost associated with a lack of clarity in patent law. At this
point I do not conjecture about the actual costs to society of any reputational behavior.
These questions lay beyond the scope of my model in its current form. However, with
the proper additions to my model I believe I can specically address policy issues. This
may present an interesting avenue for research in both theoretical and empirical analysis.
Endogenous Licensing Fee
To this point I have assumed that the licensing fee is exogenous for simplicity. If I were
to allow the licensing fee to be endogenous, I would expect it to be a function of the
observed history and the patent holders private information.
I show that if I apply the following common sense restrictions on the endogenous
nature of the licensing fee, I do not change the general intuition of my original model.19
Assume the licensing fee F (; h1) is a twice continuously di¤erentiable function of 
19Under the following assumptions, Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 are satised for an endogenous licensing fee.
These are su¢ cient conditions to prove Propositions 1 and 2.
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and h1 such that:
@F (; h1)
@
> 0; (29)
F (; L) > F (; /L) (30)
F (; L) >
Z
2
()0 () d (31)
F (; /L) <
Z
2
p (e2 (; In)) ()0 () d (32)
The intuition of these restrictions is as follows. In (29) I require that any licensing fee
secured by the PH is increasing in their expected award. In (30) the licensing fee gained
under the threat of current litigation must be greater than the licensing fee obtained
without ongoing litigation. In (31) the licensing fee agreed upon in the presence of litiga-
tion is greater than the expected litigation award for the additional act of infringement
given initial beliefs. In (32) the licensing fee agreed upon in the absence of litigation is
less than the expected litigation award for the additional act of infringement given initial
beliefs.
1.5 Conclusions
I have developed a two period model where litigation timing a¤ects the endogenous entry
behavior of potential infringers. My model adds to the existing literature by considering
the timing of litigation in the enforcement of patents and addressing the delay of infor-
mation revelation inherent in the long litigation process. Furthermore, I have uncovered
theoretical motives that can explain why patent holders with really high expectations of
litigation awards might strategically delay litigation. This nding could potentially be
used by rms found guilty of infringement to argue for a reduction in awards whenever
there is a noticeable delay between an initial act of infringement and the beginning of
litigation. Also, I provide a mechanism for policy makers to a¤ect reputational behavior.
With regards to signaling games in general, my model presents an environment where
there are two opposing reputational e¤ects. Patent holders with weak property rights
26
might want to appear strong. At the same time, patent holders with strong property
rights might want to appear weak. Similar phenomenon may exist in other signaling
games that have the potential for conicting reputational e¤ects. In this paper the high
types actually benet from their type being underestimated. One could imagine many
other situations like this. For example, a ratchet e¤ect model where perhaps intermediate
types want to show o¤to keep their jobs but high types want to avoid showing o¤ initially
to avoid a ratcheting up of the employers demands.
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CHAPTER 2
WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF ONLINE PUBLISHING
2.1 Introduction
Advances in information technology have greatly increased the variety of goods available
to consumers. While the consequences for consumer demand and welfare have been the
subject of much research, the e¤ects on producers, and potential entrants in particular
has not. We study the e¤ect of a new book publishing technology on entry in a segment
of the book industry for which data on both sales and costs was available. Although this
segment is relatively small, the ease with which data can be collected and simple pricing
terms makes it attractive for study and our qualitative conclusions extend to other more
economically signicant examples of user generated content.
When an author is unable to nd a publisher willing to take on the nancial risks of
printing and distributing their book he or she can pay a vanity publisher to have the book
printed. The term vanity publishing reects the fact that these books lose money and
their authors are purchasing the pride of seeing their work in print. Huberman, Romero
and Wu show that YouTube video uploaders derive some non-pecuniary benet from
having their videos viewed by others by demonstrating a positive relationship between
increasing viewership and future productivity of YouTube uploaders. Our analysis seeks
to estimate the parameters governing the distribution of vanity in a population of authors
considering vanity publishing.
Up until ten years ago, all vanity publishers employed o¤set printing to publish their
books.20 With o¤set printing, the initial portion of almost every print run is unusable
because the ink is not evenly distributed on the printing plates until the press has been
20O¤set printing is a technology where the inked image is transferred (or o¤set) from a plate to a
rubber blanket and then stamped on the printing surface. There are substantial xed costs because new
printing plates must be created and loaded into the press for each book published.
running for a while. Consequently, the minimum print run with traditional o¤set tech-
nology is hundreds of copies. In contrast, publishing on-demand (POD) allows publishers
to print commercially competitive books a single copy at a time.21
Much prior research has considered the e¤ects of technological change on creative-
content industries. With data on a large number of similar products, all of which have
been subject to the same technological change, researchers can identify the e¤ect of the
change on existing products. For example, Blackburn (2004) estimates the impact of le
sharing on the music industry and Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2003), henceforth BHS,
estimate the e¤ect on consumer welfare due to emerging Internet sales technology in the
book industry. In contrast to BHS, who focus on consumer welfare gains from increased
product variety in the book market, our research estimates the welfare gain of producers
from the emergence of POD publishing technology. We use results reported by BHS to
impute books sales from Amazon sales ranks for a subset of authors who publish using
POD to parameterize an expected utility function for a population of authors, and model
their decision to publish.
Our innovation is to apply tools from the patent valuation literature to entry in a
creative-content industry. We do not observe the entire value to the author of seeing
their work published, just as the value of a patent to its holder is not directly observable.
Prior to publication, each author faces uncertainty over how many copies their book
will sell. This uncertainty is resolved over time in the same way as a patent holders
uncertainty over the value of the patent. Because POD publishers compete with one
another for paying customers, their pricing is as transparent just as patent o¢ ce fees
are. Identication of the parameters governing the distribution of patent valuations is
achieved in Pakes (1986) by matching the simulated patent renewal rates to the rates
observed. We will identify the parameters governing the joint distribution of authors
valuations and expected sales by matching the simulated distribution of sales to the
observed sales distribution.
Authors would set lower prices than on demand publishers do because authors of
21Publish on demand employs digital printing. Book covering and binding can be achieved inline if
the digital press has a binding module, although small batch stand alone book binding equipment is
available.
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obscure content typically consume a nontrivial fraction of total sales (an equivalent result
can be obtained if authors derive some non-pecuniary marginal benet from each sale).
This conclusion extends to other markets where user generated content is delivered via
platforms such as YouTube or MySpace. As is typical of "free" content, consumers pay
for content by being subjected to advertising, and the amount of advertising the platform
chooses is higher than the contents creator would prefer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the publishing
industry in the context of recent research. We model the authors utility maximization
problem in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the simulation methods we use to estimate
parameters governing the distribution of expected sales and author utility. In Section 5
we describe our data and the method we use to impute sales from sales rankings. We
present our results in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Publishing Industry
Since Gutenberg, there have been signicant economies of scale in printing. This, com-
bined with the signicant costs of editing and typesetting, has made it nearly impossible
for publishers to turn a prot on low volume books. Limited shelf space constrains book-
stores to o¤er only a fraction of the universe of available titles.22 Bookstore owners rely
on a variety of signals of book quality when deciding which books to stock (e.g. book
reviews, sales of previous works by the same author, endorsements from well-known indi-
viduals on the back cover, return policy, etc.). In this environment, a publishers decision
to invest in the production and distribution of a book is a powerful signal of quality be-
cause bookstores may return unsold copies to the publisher for a refund in the rst year
after publication. While the refund may be partial, allowing returns helps to align the
publishers incentives with bookstores.23
Most POD books are available for sale exclusively online or from the author. With-
out the credibility a non-subsidy press conveys, the barriers to bookstore distribution
22A large bookstore might stock 20-40 thousand unique titles whereas there are ~2.3 million books in
print. Brynsdolf, Hu and Smith.
23If a publisher refused to accept returns it would always have a strong incentive to sell more copies
to bookstores and so would be unable to send a creditable signal of expected sales.
30
are substantial. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most bookstore owners will not even
consider stocking a self-published or vanity press title unless the author convinces them
otherwise in person.24 Only 0.25% of the titles in our dataset ever achieved substan-
tial retail distribution, so our decision to ignore brick-and-mortar retail sales should be
justied for the remaining 99.75%.
We focus on a population of authors who are unable to have their current manuscript
picked up by a legitimate publisher. There are many reasons why potential authors are
unable to nd a legitimate publisher. New authors may lack the skill, marketability, or
reputation to justify publication. New authors may be unable to nd the appropriate
channels for distribution, or a¤ord the search costs for marketing their work to potential
publishers. Also, some authors may just be unlucky, in the sense that even though there
work might be highly marketable, asymmetric information in the review process, and a
failure to signal their true talent causes them to be passed over. Even so, given the small
number of successful commercial authors relative to the number of potential authors as
a whole, one could imagine that the distributions that govern expectations and vanity of
the subset of vanity authors is still representative of authors as a whole.
The Long Tail
The internet o¤ers consumers both a larger variety of products and tools that lower the
cost of search. Whereas niche products are typically unavailable at most retail outlets,
on the internet they sometimes make up a large fraction of sales, a phenomenon Ander-
son (2004) coined the Long Tail. The relative importance of blockbusters and obscure
products, (i.e. the head and tail of the product distribution) has been a subject of con-
siderable debate between those who believe that "the tail is likely to be extremely at
and populated by titles that are mostly a diversion for consumers whose appetite for
24See e.g. Writer Beware, Science Fiction and Fantasy Writers of America
(http://www.sfwa.org/Beware/), or the website of Johnathan Cli¤ord who claims to have coined
the term Vanity Publisher (http://www.vanitypublishing.info/). Of the more than 17 thousand
titles published by iUniverse by 2004 only 20 made it onto Barnes & Nobles shelves, despite the 25%
ownership stake Barnes and Nobles held in iUniverse. XLibris authors did little better; only 20 of the 8
thousand titles published by 2004 were picked up by traditional publishers for retail distribution. Gail
Feldman Got a Book in You?, New York Times, March 1, 2004.
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true blockbusters continues to grow"25 and those who believe consumer demand "will
continue to shift from a few best-selling products to niche products"26. BHS estimate
that 13 million copies of books not available at typical brick and mortar retailers are
sold each year, whereas POD account for some ten or twenty million books over the last
decade, and J.K. Rowlings Harry Potter series has sold several hundred million copies
worldwide, all since 1997.27 In the book industry blockbusters continue to dominate.
BHS examines the impact of increased product variety made available through elec-
tronic markets. Specically, they calculate the increase in consumer surplus resulting
from books sold at online bookstores, which are not available at traditional "brick and
mortar" bookstores. They dub these newly available books "obscure titles." POD books
clearly t their denition of obscure books as traditional bookstores almost never stock
titles from subsidy publishers. Their strategy is to assume that books with Amazon.com
sales ranks greater than some cuto¤ value are only available online. Then, they estimate
the relationship of sales rank to actual weekly sales and integrate over all books with
sales ranks above the cuto¤. In comparison to the e¤ect of newly available but previ-
ously created content, content specically created in response to the increase in variety
is small.
What is Vanity?
We dene vanity as the portion of utility gained by an author from the publication of
his or her manuscript which is independent of any prots. According to the NEA 7%
of American adults engage in creative writing at least once per year, and approximately
one seventh have their works published.28 Most artists want an audience for their work;
similarly, most people want attention from others. As with gambling or playing sports or
accumulating collectibles, in the arts there is a spectrum of talent and potential income:
most amateurs pay to enjoy their hobby, and some individuals are able to make a small
25Elberse (2008).
26Brynjolfsson, Hu and Simester (2007).
27Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith report obscure books sales of $578 million per year and an average price
of $42.18, implying sales of some 13 million books.
28National Endowment for the Arts, 2002 Survey of Public Participation in the Arts.
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income, but only the most talented are able to make a living at it.
None of our results depend on the precise nature of the utility gain, so long as the
authors welfare depends only on money income and the binary decision, publish or
dont publish. We rely on variation across potential authors in income, enjoyment of
writing and egotism, to generate a distribution of utility from publication which we refer
to as vanity. We favor the traditional explanation implied by the term "vanity press";
authors pursue the pride resulting from seeing their work in print. Of course, many
individuals who do not think of themselves as authors write books. Having written a
published book on a relevant topic to ones profession is an important credential that
would likely appear on a resume. Amateurs who hope to become professional authors
might hope that the notice (or at least feedback) they receive for their current book may
increase the chance of success in the future. However, given the extreme improbability
of commercial success, the chief source of utility is being able to think of oneself as a
"published author." An alternative theory that could potentially explain our observations
about the non-pecuniary benets of using POD could be that authors are investing in
human capital. To counter this claim would require a thorough analysis of the sales
performance of these authors over their lifetime. However, there are a number of authors
who have published more than one book with POD, and there does not appear to be a
signicant increase in sales from an authors rst title to later titles.
If authors care about how many copies of their books are sold independently of the
e¤ect of sales on prots then our results will be biased. xLibris does sell marketing services
for the books it publishes.29 Although anecdotal evidence suggests that bookstores are
entirely unresponsive to this marketing, authors might be purchasing marketing because
they gain additional vanity based utility from being a "real" author whose books are
carried by brick and mortar retailers. As would be expected if their marketing services
were as ine¤ective as we believe, POD rms do not publicly release data pertaining to
the e¤ectiveness of their marketing services.
29For example, an advertisement in ForeWord, a magazine containing reviews of new books published
by independent presses, costs $399.
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2.2 The Model
In this section we develop a model of author choice that incorporates the possible decisions
facing authors at the time our data was collected. The goal is to establish a theoretical
framework that simulates a potential authors behavior given their individual preferences
and expectations. The results of this section will give insight into the distributions of
potential author preferences and expectations, by matching the observed characteristics of
authors choosing to publish with Print on Demand, with the characteristics of simulated
authors choosing to publish with print on demand.
Players
We envision a population of authors, each of whom has written a single manuscript.
Individual potential authors are characterized by their demand functions and vanities.
Let an author i0s random demand function be x (si; "i) ; where si is the authors private
information and "i is a random component of realized sales that remains unobserved until
the author chooses a publication method. We assume s ? ": Let an authors vanity be
vi; which is the value they receive upon publication of their book. Therefore, author
types are drawn from the corresponding distributions f(s); g(v) dened over respective
domains S and V: Therefore an author type t is a member of the set T = fS  V g. We
denote the joint distribution of types  (s; v) = f(s)g(v):
Actions
An authors action prole a; is dened by their publishing decision such that a 2 A =
fNone; POD; fTRDQgg is a choice between respective actions: dont publish, Print on
Demand, and traditional vanity press, with various quantity choices such that fTRDQg =
f200; 500; (1000;1)g.
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Utilities
An author i0s utility  (a j si; vi) depends on their type, action, realization of sales, royalty
rates, and costs.30 Therefore we denote the authors utility for each action respectively
as:
 (none j si; vi) = 0
 (POD j si; vi) = vi +RPODx (si; "i)  CPOD

 
TRDQj j si; vi

=
8<: vi +RTrax (si; "i)  CTra (Qj) , if x (si; "i) < Qjvi +RTraQj   CTra (Qj) , if x (si; "i)  Qj
9=;
Cj and Rj are the cost and authors royalty rate under technology j, and { Qj,
CTra(Qj)} are the menu of available traditional print-run sizes and costs. Note that if
the author chooses traditional vanity publishing, the author must choose the print-run
before publishing and so the number of copies printed is a capacity constraint and is
therefore a¤ected by realization of demand.
2.3 Simulation
Simulated Authors
We take create a simulated potential author by taking separate random draws si and vi
from the distributions f(s) and g(v):We repeat this process n times to form a population
P = fsi; vigni=1 of n potential authors. If i author chooses to publish a book, we then
add noise by taking a random draw "i from the distribution h (") such that simulated
sales for an author i becomes x (si; "i) = si"i: In order to estimate our model we need to
make assumptions about functional forms of the distributions governing expected sales,
vanity, and uncertainty.
Assumption 1 s  exp(+   log(Uniform[0; 1])) Pareto
Assumption 2 v  exp(N(; 2v)) lognormal
30xLibriss pays 10% on all sales at Amazon, so we assume a constant 10% royalty rate.
35
Assumption 3 "  exp(N( 2"
2
; 2")) lognormal:
We seek to estimate the ve parameters  = (v; 
2
v; ; ; 
2
"): the mean and vari-
ance of the authors utility from being published,  and 2 respectively; the parameters
governing the mean and variance of the distribution of authors expected sales,  and 
respectively; and the variance of the ratio of realized sales to authors expected sales, 2".
The simulation requires that authors choose the action that maximizes their expected
prots. Given the functional form of the above distributions as determined by the set of
unknown parameters  we denote the expected prots for an author type ti 2 (S  V ) as
E (none j ti; ) = 0
E (POD j ti; ) = vi + siRPOD   CPOD
E
 
TRDQj j ti; 

= vi +
Qj
siZ
0
si"RTrah
 
" j 2"

d"+
1Z
Qj
si
QjRTrah
 
" j 2"

d"  CTra (Qj)
Because POD ensures that no unsold copies are produced, expected prot under this
printing technology is una¤ected by the variance of Noise(2"). We assume risk neutrality.
If authors are risk averse, then expected utility from a POD book will be decreasing in
the variance of noise. However, assuming risk aversion, expected utility from traditional
publishing would decrease even faster.
Figure 1(Following Page) illustrates an authors optimal choice as regions in the type
space. Notice that the region where types are choosing not to publish depends on both
their vanity and expected sales. Author types with relatively small vanities may choose
not to publish even thought their expected sales are greater than other types with lower
expected sales and higher vanities. As a consequence, the distribution of observed POD
sales will depend also on the distributions of vanity. This property will help us identify
the parameters of the distributions of vanity and all authors expected sales that result
in a distribution of POD sales similar to the distribution of our data. Figure 2(Following
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Figure 7: Showing a shift in the boundaries of potential author choices for a decrease in
":
Page) illustrates level sets for expected utility in the type space of author characteristics
for two publishing decisions: POD and a traditional vanity printing of 200. The curvature
of the level set for a traditional vanity publishing choice reects the tension between
diminishing average costs and a capacity constraint. In contrast, the level set for POD
is a straight line, reecting the notion that since noise has no impact on expected POD
sales, vanity and expected sales are perfectly substitutable(in terms of expected utility).
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Figure 8: Level sets for utility (U0) in the typespace of author characteristics for two
publishing technologies POD and Traditional (Q = 200).
2.4 Estimation
We identify our parameters by functional form. Using our understanding of an authors
decision making process, we can dene the space of author types that will choose POD
as a function of an individual authors vanity and expected sales.
Let TPOD () = ft0 2 T j a (t0 j ) = PODg : Therefore we dene the distribution of
sales for authors choosing types POD as
z ("s j ) =  (s0; v0 j s0; v0 2 TPOD ())h (") :
Our simulation exercise allows us to estimate the parameters  by nding values ^ such
that the conditional distribution of sales of simulated authors z("s j b) resembles the the
distribution of observed POD sales in the data.31 We choose estimated parameter values
31This procedure is analogous to a GMM estimation in which not all the moment restrictions can bind
with equality; every sales level at which the simulated and observed CDF must be equal puts another
restriction on the parameters. Because not all these restrictions can be met simultaneously (that is, no
parameter values will make the simulated and observed distributions exactly equal at each sales level),
whatever metric we use to evaluate how closethe two distributions are will e¤ectively be some function
that assigns weights to the restriction that the CDF of the simulated and observed sales distributions
are equal at some sales levels.
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minimize the mean squared di¤erence in CDFs at each level of observed sales in the
data.32 Our results did not change when we used the mean, absolute di¤erence in CDFs.
Therefore we minimize the sample analog of the mean squared di¤erence in CDF.33
Let ZData (Sales) be the cumulative distribution of observed sales in the data. Let
Z("s j b) be the cumulative distribution of simulated sales for all simulated types t 2 P
such that a(t j b) = POD: Therefore, our objective function becomes
1Z
0
h
ZData (Sales)  Z(Sales j b)i2 d(Sales) 
NX
i=1

#(ObsSales  ObsSalesi)
N
  #(SimSales  ObsSalesi)
N
2
:
which we minimize w.r.t the parameters =(v; 
2
v; ; ; 
2
") :
For every simulated population of potential authors we can use our choice model to de-
termine the sub-population that will choose to publish using POD. Using the population
of POD authors, we can then simulate the distribution of realized sales. Identication
occurs because each parameter to be estimated has a di¤erent impact on this simulated
distribution of realized sales at an estimated parameter value. In other words, we cannot
replicate the impact of a change of one variable on the cumulative densities at all levels
of sales, by holding that variable xed and instead using some variation of the other
parameters. The intuition for identication is presented at length in Appendix B.
Once we have estimated parameters values for a simulation run, we can compute
the probability that an author will choose POD publishing (it is the fraction of the n
simulated authors who choose POD publishing under the estimated parameter values).
One over this probability is the number of manuscripts per POD published book, so
dividing N , the observed number of POD books, by the estimated probability that an
32Note that the distribution of expected sales in our author population is not the distribution of
expected sales for POD authors. POD authors are a subset of this overall population.
33To nd the minimum of our objective function, we rely on the MATLAB algorithm fminsearch which
uses the Nelder-Mead simplex search algorithm. Since proving the uniqueness of the solution analytically
is impractical, we instead vary the programs initial guess(using 1000 randomized settings for our rst
simulation run) to make sure that it converges to the same minimum.
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author will choose POD publishing yields the number of estimated number of potential
entrants.34
We report errors that account for both simulation error inherent in the simulation
process, and sampling error. These errors are computed by sampling with replacement
from our data of authors to create B bootstrap samples of size w. For each bootstrap
sample b, we repeatedly taking new random draws from the underlying distributions, and
re-estimate our parameters for T simulation runs. Thus for each sample b we nd the
estimated parameter values

^
b
1; :::; ^
b
T

; determine the mean estimate ^
b
=
TP
t=1
^
b
1 ; and
then calculate the simulation error as:
s2
^b;Sim
=
1
T
TX
t=1

^
b
t   ^
b2
:
We then account for sampling error by incorporating the average parameter estimate
for each bootstrap replication. Thus the measure of sampling error becomes
s2
^;Boot
=
1
1 B
BX
b=1

^
b   ^b
2
:
where ^

=
BP
b=1
1
B
^
b
:
We report two sets of standard errors: First, we calculate standard errors assuming
that our imputed data parameters are precisely identied. Then as a robustness test,
we calculate standard errors that take into account the standard errors reported in BHS.
These two-stagestandard errors allow us to measure the robustness of our results to
variation in the assumed parameter values. Therefore, we take separate draws, s1 and
s2; from two normal distributions with standard deviations equal the standard errors
reported in BHS . Then, we proceed as if the true values of 1 and 2 di¤ered from BHSs
estimates by s1 and s2 standard deviations respectively. We take n new draws, carry out
both the estimation procedures described above, the welfare calculations described below
and store the results. This procedure is repeated T times for each of the B bootstrap
samples. The resultant distribution is the basis for our standard errors reported in Tables
34A more detailed explanation of this calculation and an example can be found in Appendix B.
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A.1-A.4.
Our results depend on the assumed functional form of vanity. To illustrate this we
present results for alternate assumptions in Tables C, D, and E in the Appendix. In
particular, the estimated population of potential authors is particularly sensitive to our
assumed form of vanity. Allowing for negative values of vanity, such as the case with a
normal distribution decreases the number of stimulants that end up publishing, which
it. In a similar manner, allowing for a vanity distribution with xed mass points at zero
will also increase the estimates of author population relative to our initial assumptions.
Furthermore, we nd that increasing the mass at zero will further increase estimates of
potential author populations, although with relatively little impact on the estimates of
other parameters. However, since our welfare estimates are derived from the number of
current POD authors that would not have published but for the existence of pod technol-
ogy, and since the conditional distributions of simulated authors who choose to publish
with POD varies less than estimates of the overall population, our welfare calculations
are less sensitive to our assumptions of functional form.
2.5 Data
On November 11, 2004 we collected data from Amazon.com on books published by the
two largest POD publishers: xLibris and iUniverse. Our data were collected at a time
when these two leading publishers dominated the POD market. Although several other
POD publishers existed at the time none has more than a few hundred books on Ama-
zon. The subsequent entry of more niche focused and substantial competitors eventually
led iUniverse and xLibris to announce a merger in January 2009.35 Their merger should
relieve competitive pressure on the rms, because both targeted the same segment: ama-
teurs who wanted to think of themselves as "professional" authors. We observe all titles
available on Amazon.com published by either rm.
35Booksurge was a small POD until its acquisition by Amazon in 2005. Lulu.com and CreateSpace
(another Amazon company) take the POD concept to its logical conclusion charging no upfront fees and
providing distribution and on demand production of CDs, DVDs and electronic content. The author
need only purchase a single proof copy before their written, audio or video content becomes available
for sale on Amazon. Because the process is entirely automated, Lulu.com and CreateSpace have almost
zero xed cost per title and makes a prot even if the only copy ever sold is the authors proof.
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In the text, we present xLibris data and results. Since xLibris and iUniverse o¤er
virtually identical services at the same costs and posses similar market shares(xLibris
43% and iUniverse 37%) over the time period we examine, we use the results from our
analysis of the xLibris to calculate the welfare e¤ects for the entire market. In other
words, we assume that xLibris and iUniverse are perfect substitutes for authors choosing
POD publishing, and scale our welfare results according to the rmsrespective market
shares.
According to Chevalier and Goolsbee, "Amazon claims that for books in the top
10,000 ranks, the rankings are based on the last 24-hours and updated hourly. For
books ranked 10,001-100,000, the ranks are updated once per day. For books ranked
greater than 100,000, the sales ranks are updated once per month (Amazon, 2000). Many
hundreds of thousands of books, however, have a rank but almost certainly have less than
one sale per month. Italie (2001) claims that for these rarely purchased books, Amazon
bases the rank on the total sales since Amazons inception." None of the books in our
sample have a rank under 10,000 the vast majority have ranks greater than 100,000.
We construct a measure of sales since Amazons inception using sales rank and BHSs
results.36 Using data obtained from a small publisher on 321 obscure books, they t their
data to a log-linear distribution:
Log(Quantity) = 1 + 2  log(rank) + "
and found
1 = 10:5(:156) 2 =  0:87(0:017):
We use these estimates to impute actual sales from data on Amazon.com sales ranks
and weeks on sale. Unfortunately, this is a measure of transactions completed prior to the
date when we collected data, whereas authors probably care primarily about expected
total sales. To address this potential problem, we exclude books that have been on sale
for less than one year. We examined the 5229 books published by xLibris that had been
36Chevalier and Goolsbee also provide parameter values for the imputation of sales from Amazon rank.
However because they do not provide standard errors we would not be able to calculate standard errors
for our results that properly account for the imprecision of the parameters used to impute sales.
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Figure 9: Sales as a function of days on sale
on sale for at least one year (see Figure 3), and found no clear relationship between
either the mean or the variance of sales and the period of time over which the book has
been available for. We take this as a strong basis under which to proceed under the
assumption that all sales take place in the rst year (or at least the vast majority). Table
1 presents the summary statistics for our sample along with the summary statistics for
BHS. These statistics highlight another potential source of error in our analysis, stemming
from the di¤erent support of observed sales ranks. Ideally, wed like our data to cover a
similar distribution of observed sales ranks. We rely on the fact that both of these sets
of observations capture distributions of obscure titles, with relatively high sales ranks.
Some of these di¤erences may reect the time that elapsed between BHSs ndings and
when our data was collected (approximately 2 years).
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Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
BHS(Sales Rank) 861 31,532.85 58,350.92 238 961,367
xLibris(Sales Rank) 5,229 104,210.61 244,587.31 12,968 1,514,226
Table 1. Summary Statistics for BHS and xLibris Data
2.6 Results
We simulate the publishing decision for n = 10000 authors who choose either POD,
traditional publishing, or not to publish. xLibris charges $500 to prepare a manuscript
for publication and make it available for sale on the internet. We assume the books
price will be $25 .37 If an author selects traditional publishing, they must also select a
quantity cost pair from the set such that
(Q;CTra(Q)) 2 f(200; $1530); (500; $3273); (1000; $3782)g:38
These traditional current prices probably reect the competition from POD, thus in
the counterfactual (the absence of POD) one would imagine that these prices would be
higher. For this reason, the welfare improvement from the existence of POD will be
underestimated, as even fewer authors would publish in the absence of POD.
We estimated parameter values as discussed above and reported them in the Ap-
pendix. We report two sets of results. The results in Table A.1 and A.2 reect only
sampling error (that is, the simulated standard errors do not reect the possibility that
BHSs estimates are not exact), while the results in Table A.3 and A.4 reect both the
simulation error and the standard error in BHSs estimates.
Figure 4 shows the CDF resulting from one of the simulation runs used for Table A.
There are more titles with less that 20 copies sold in the simulation than are actually
observed, but the t seems to be good overall. Once we have tted parameter values,
37The approximate average price in our data.
38In our simulation we allow an author to print any quantity greater than 1000 for the same average
cost (3.782 per copy) to model the notion that an author can always order multiple print runs. We adapt
cost data from the print-broker Rjcom.com.
44
Figure 10: The CDF from a simulation run.
evaluating the consequences of counter-factuals is not di¢ cult. We simply take a number
of random draws equal to the estimated number of potential authors and then vary the
publishing technologies available to potential authors. In particular, we calculate authors
welfare and the number of titles that would have been published in the absence of POD
technology. The results we report in Tables C and D of the Appendix correspond to
the parameter values of Tables A and B respectively. Of the 5229 xLibris titles in our
sample (all using POD), we estimate only 181 would have been published with traditional
technology and authorswelfare would drop from $1.2 million to $47,000 (where the
outside option, not publishing, is normalized to $0).
While the estimated welfare e¤ects may not be signicant in economic terms, the
utility gained by authors in signicant: POD technology is responsible for an additional
8300 titles being published and a $2.2 million increase in author welfare, for an average
of approximately $300 in author surplus per title published over and above the $500/title
publishers fee. Our results show that while allowing authors access to POD technology
does not signicantly increase an authors expected prot, however, the estimated utility
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gained from being published is signicant. Therefore, even if POD does not signicantly
increase a vanity authors expected sales; it does increase welfare by reducing barriers to
entry, thereby allowing more authors to indulge in vanity.
POD allows marginal authors to enter the market by reducing the xed cost of entry
and allowing them to capture utility from vanity. Furthermore, the estimated utility
gains from vanity for the average author are large relative to their share of expected
sales. This seems reasonable, given that print on demand is a relatively new publishing
option. Over time, we would expect the xed costs associated with using POD to fall
as the industry is becomes more competitive, limiting a publishers ability to extract an
authors welfare gains from vanity. Further analysis in this regard would require more
data on the POD publishers costs.
2.7 Conclusions
Creativity and art are important in the sense that they have positive externalities. Thats
why we teach them in our schools and use our taxes to subsidize them. If there are more
artists, then the artistic community will be larger, as will the positive externality from
the exchange of ideas and techniques. Even for those who do not derive any pecuniary
benet, the production of creative content improves communication skills and enhances
mental exibility. Thus, we are concerned with the e¤ect of technological change not just
on the ow of prots, but also on the entry decision.
The manuscripts these authors have written are not viable for trade publication.
They are necessarily marginal producers and we should expect their surplus to be small,
whatever the available technologies. That POD technology, specically the reduction in
entry costs, should cause a an economically insignicant increase in producer surplus is
not surprising because it is only large relative to the small initial producer surplus.
While the POD industry is a small fraction of the entire book industry and thus of
limited economic import, the number of titles per year is increasing. Approximately 1%
of the books on Amazon are from POD publishers, but all POD titles have been published
in the last decade so their share in recently published books is higher and over a long
enough time horizon content that has not yet been produced will dominate. Long run
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consumer welfare from creative-content depends crucially on the continual introduction of
new products because the most popular products are typically of recent vintage. Because
the pool of potential blockbusters is limited to newly created content and it is di¢ cult
to identify which previously obscure artist is likely to create a hit, then if there is more
content being produced for the tail, we should expect the quality of future hits to improve.
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Appendix 1
Lemma 1. For all  2 R; e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)) > 0 is continuously di¤erentiable in
2 (L) ; 

2 ( /L) ; and :
Proof: Within each history of period 2, each patent holder types expected prots are
xed as indicated by (1) (3) (5) (7).
PH (L;Out; ) =  + F   e1
PH (L; In; ) =  +    e1
PH ( /L; In; ) =  ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In))  e2 ( j In)  e1
PH ( /L;Out; ) = F + p (e2 ( j Out))  e2 ( j Out)  e1
where e2 ( j In) = argmax
e22R+
f ( + 1) p (e2)  e2g
where e2 ( j Out) = argmax
e22R+
fp (e2)  e2g
Therefore, the rst order condition of a patent holders prot maximization problem is
given in (21) by,
p0(e1)
26664
PH (L;Out; )  PH ( /L;Out; )+
2 (L)
 
PH (L; In; )  PH (L;Out; )+
2 ( /L)
 
PH ( /L;Out; )  PH ( /L; In; )
37775  1 (33)
by (22), this condition holds with equality for any positive amount of optimal e¤ort.
Therefore, since p0(e1) is continuously di¤erentiable and p00(e1) < 0 for all e1 2 R+,
the inverse function theorem proves p0(e1) has an inverse g () = [p0(e1)] 1 which is also
continuously di¤erentiable over the interval p0 (R+) such that for all z in the domain of
g () ; g0 (z) = 1
p00(g(z)) :
Recall,
 () =
26664
EPH

PH j L;Out
  EPH PH j /L;Out+
2 (L)
 
EPH

PH j L; In
  EPH PH j L;Out+
2 ( /L)
 
EPH

PH j /L;Out
  EPH PH j /L; In
37775 (34)
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such that the rst order condition is written
p0(e1) () = 1 (35)
Therefore the inverse g () has domain

1
 ()

g (p0(e1)) = g

1
 ()

(36)
Thus I have
e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)) = g

1
 ()

(37)
By the inverse function theorem, and my assumption that p00 (e1) < 0, I have
g0

1
 ()

=
1
p00

g

1
 ()
 < 0 (38)
@g

1
 ()

@ ()
= g0

1
 ()
 @  1
 ()

@ ()
(39)
= g0

1
 ()

@
@ ()
[ ()] 1 (40)
Therefore, since
g0

1
 ()

=
1
p00

g

1
 ()
 < 0 (41)
@g

1
 ()

@ ()
=  g0

1
 ()

[ ()] 2 (42)
> 0 (43)
Therefore, since p (e1) is concave, g

1
 ()

is an increasing function of  () > 0:
Therefore, the sign of the derivative of optimal e¤ort g

1
 ()

with respect to variable
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x 2 f; 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g is such that
@g

1
 ()

@x
> 0 if
@
@x
[ ()] > 0 (44)
@g

1
 ()

@x
< 0 if
@
@x
[ ()] < 0 (45)
Furthermore I nd,
@ ()
@2 (L)
= [   F ] (46)
@ ()
@2 ( /L)
= [F + p (e2 ( j Out))  e2 ( j Out)   ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In)) + e2 ( j In)]
(47)
Using the envelope theorem, because of maximizers e2 ( j In) and e2 ( j Out) ; I nd
@ ()
@
= [1 + 2 (L)  + 

2 ( /L) (e

2 ( j Out)  ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In)))  e2 ( j Out)]
(48)
Lemma 2: As 2 ( /L) increases, the change in rst period patent holder e¤ort is a
weakly decreasing function of patent holder type ; such that
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 ( /L) @
 0;8 (49)
Proof: From Lemma 1, I know that
@e1

j2(L);2

/L

@2

/L
 < 0 if and only if @ ()
@2

/L
 < 0.
Furthermore, from Lemma 1
@ ()
@2 ( /L)
= (50)
[F + p (e2 ( j Out))  e2 ( j Out)   ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In)) + e2 ( j In)] (51)
Therefore, using the envelope theorem because of second period optimal e¤orts for sub-
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games 3 and 4 (e2 ( j Out) and e2 ( j In)) given in (5) and (7); I conclude that
@ ()
@2 ( /L) @
= (52)
@ [F + p (e2 ( j Out))  e2 ( j Out)   ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In)) + e2 ( j In)]
@
(53)
= p (e2 ( j Out))  ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In))) (54)
< 0, 8 > 0 (55)
= 0; 8  0 (56)
Therefore,
@2 ()
@2 ( /L) @
< 0; 8 > 0 (57)
@2 ()
@2 ( /L) @
= 0; 8  0 (58)
This proves
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 ( /L) @
 0; 8 > 0 (59)
Lemma 3. As 2 (L) increases, the change in equilibrium rst period e¤ort is a weakly
increasing function of type :
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 (L) @
 0; 8 (60)
Proof: From Lemma 1, I know that
@e1

j2(L);2

/L

@2(L)
> 0 if and only if @ ()
@2(L)
> 0.
Furthermore, from Lemma 1,
@ ()
@2 (L)
=  + F (61)
Therefore,
@2 ()
@2 (L) @
=
@ [ + F ]
@
(62)
=  (63)
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Therefore,
@2 ()
@2 (L) @
> 0; 8 () > 0 (64)
By Lemma 1, this proves
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 (L) @
> 0; 8 () > 0 (65)
Therefore,
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 (L) @
> 0; 8 () > 0 (66)
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 ( /L) @
= 0; 8 () < 0 (67)

Lemma 4: The infringers expected prots from entry, after observing the existence
of litigation in period 1 (h1 = L) ; is
(4.1) monotonically increasing in 2 ( /L)
(4.2) monotonically decreasing in 2 (L)
Proof of (4.1): Consider the change in expected prots from entry upon observing the
existence of litigation in period 1 (h1 = L) as I change 2 ( /L) :
IN (L; In) (68)
Taking the derivative of net expected prot with respect to the infringers equilibrium
entry probability, conditional on observing the absence of litigation I get,
@

IN (L; In)

@2 ( /L)
(69)
=
@
R
[F   ]( j L)d
@2 ( /L)
(70)
=
Z
[F   ] @( j L)
@2 ( /L)
d (71)
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by Lemma 2 I have
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 ( /L) @
< 0 (72)
In other words, as I increase 2 ( /L) ; any type b is reducing its rst period e¤ort at a
faster rate than any type  < b: Therefore, since
 ( j L) = p (e

1 ())0 ()R
2
p (e1 ())0 () d
(73)
then
@( j L)
@2 ( /L) @
< 0 (74)
Therefore,
@IN (L; In)
@2 ( /L)
> 0 (75)
In short, as 2 ( /L) increases, the existence of litigation in period 1 will become less threat-
ening, because in relative terms, lower types will increase the probability that they create
litigation faster than higher types as 2 ( /L) increases.
Proof of (4.2): Consider the change in expected prots from entry upon observing
the existence of litigation in period 1 (h1 = L) as I change 2 (L) :
.
Taking the derivative of net expected prot with respect to the infringers equilibrium
entry probability, conditional on observing the existence of litigation I get,
@IN (L; In)
@2 (L)
(76)
=
@
R
[F   ]( j L)d
@2 (L)
(77)
=
Z
[F   ] @( j L)
@2 (L)
d (78)
Recall that by Lemma 3 I know
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 (L) @
> 0 (79)
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and therefore
@2( j L)
@2 (L) @
> 0 (80)
@IN (L; In)
@2 (L)
< 0 (81)

Lemma 5: The infringers expected prots from entry after observing the absence of
litigation (h1 = /L) in period 1, is
(5.1) monotonically decreasing in 2 ( /L)
(5.2) monotonically increasing in 2 (L).
Proof of (5.1): Consider the change in the infringers expected prots from entry upon
observing the absence of litigation in period 1 (h1 = /L) as I change 2 ( /L)
Taking the derivative of expected prot from entry with respect to the infringers equi-
librium entry probability, conditional on observing the absence of litigation I get,
@IN ( /L; In)
@2 ( /L)
(82)
=
@
R
[F + p (e2 ( j Out))  p (e2 ( j In))]( j /L)d
@2 ( /L)
(83)
=
Z
[F + p (e2 ( j Out))  p (e2 ( j In))]
@( j /L)
@2 ( /L)
d (84)
where
where e2 ( j In) = argmax
e22R+
f ( + 1) p (e2)  e2g
where e2 ( j Out) = argmax
e22R+
fp (e2)  e2g
By Lemma 2 I have
@e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 ( /L) @
< 0 (85)
In other words, as I increase 2 ( /L) ; any type b is reducing its rst period e¤ort at a
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faster rate than any type  < b: Therefore, since
 ( j /L) = (1  p (e

1 ()))0 ()R
2
(1  p (e1 ()))0 () d
(86)
Lemma 2 proves that
@2( j /L)
@2 ( /L) @
> 0 (87)
Therefore,
@IN ( /L; In)
@2 ( /L)
< 0 (88)
In short, as 2 ( /L) increases, the absence of litigation in period 1 will become more threat-
ening, because in relative terms, lower types will increase the probability that they create
litigation faster than higher types as 2 ( /L) increases
Proof of (5.2): Consider the change in the infringers expected prots from entry upon
observing the existence of litigation in period 1 (h1 = L) as I change 2 (L) :
@IN ( /L; In)
@2 (L)
(89)
=
@
R
[F + p (e2 ( j Out))  p (e2 ( j In))]( j /L)d
@2 (L)
(90)
=
Z
[F + p (e2 ( j Out))  p (e2 ( j In))]
@( j /L)
@2 (L)
d (91)
where
where e2 ( j In) = argmax
e22R+
f ( + 1) p (e2)  e2g
where e2 ( j Out) = argmax
e22R+
fp (e2)  e2g
Recall that by Lemma 3 I know
@2e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L))
@2 (L) @
> 0 (92)
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and therefore
@2( j /L)
@2 (L) @
< 0 (93)
@IN ( /L; In)
@2 (L)
> 0 (94)

Lemma 6: In any Bayesian equilibrium 2 (L) > 0 only if 

2 ( /L) = 1:
Proof: By assumption,

IN ( /L; In j )  IN ( /L;Out j ) > IN (L; In j )  IN (L;Out j ) (95)
Therefore using (23) and (24) I see that if ( j /L)  ( j L) then
IN ( /L; In) > IN (L; In) : (96)
Furthermore, if 2 ( /L) < 

2 (L) then from (28) and (29) I know
@e1

j2(L);2

/L

@
 0 8;
which implies ( j /L)  ( j L) and thus IN ( /L; In) > IN (L; In) which contradicts
2 ( /L) < 

2 (L) : Therefore I conclude that in any equilibrium 

2 ( /L)  2 (L) :
Furthermore, since the inequality in (98) is strict, it cannot be true that
IN ( /L; In) = IN (L; In) = 0: (97)
Therefore, the infringer cannot be indi¤erent to entry under both histories f /Lg and fLg :
Thus 2 (L) > 0 only if 

2 ( /L) = 1:
Proposition1: For any setting of the parameters and any continuous function p ()
under my assumptions, and for any possible prior beliefs 0 () and any type space   R;
there exists a unique Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof of Existence: I can check to see if there is an equilibrium when the infringer
best responses are in pure strategies using the following procedure:
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1. Consider a hypothetical best response f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g from the set
f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g 2 ffOut;Outg ; fOut; Ing ; fIn; Ingg ;
excluding f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = fIn;Outg because of Lemma 6.
2. Take f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g and plug it into each patent holders prot maximization prob-
lem to nd the optimal choice of e¤ort for each patent holder type:
fe1 ( j ^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)) 8g
3. Using fe1 ( j ^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)) 8g ; calculate  ( j L) and  ( j /L) :
4. Using  ( j L) and  ( j /L) ; calculate IN (L; In) and IN ( /L; In) :
5. Using IN (L; In) and IN ( /L; In) I know
f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L) ; fe1 ( j ^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)) 8gg
is a Bayesian equilibrium only if, for all h1 2 fL; /Lg
^2(h1) = fIng ; only if IN (h1; In) > 0
and
^2(h1) = fOutg ; only if IN (h1; In) < 0
because by denition
2 (h1) = 1; if 
IN (h1; In) > 0
2 (h1) 2 (0; 1) ; if IN (h1; In) = 0
2 (h1) = 0; if 
IN (h1; In) < 0
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When the potential infringers best responses are not in pure strategies, I can resume
the search for equilibria by asking the following question. Given the optimal rst period
e¤ort for each type of patent holder when infringer best responses are f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g =
fOut; Ing ; which of the best responses: fOut;Outg or fIn; Ing ; would the infringer
wish to deviate too?
Consider the following cases of the deviations to fOut;Outg or fIn; Ing given
the set of patent holder e¤ort (e1 ( j Out; In))8 2 :
Case 1: Assume that given the set of patent holder e¤ort fe1 ( j Out; In) 8 2 g ;
the infringer wishes to play f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g = fOut;Outg : Then by
f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g =2 ffOut;Outg ; fOut; Ing ; fIn; Ingg ;
I know its expected prots from entry conditional on observing f /Lg are negative given
fe1 ( j Out; In) 8 2 g ; but positive given fe1 ( j Out;Out) 8 2 g : Thus by Lemma
5, the infringers second period expected prots from entry, after observing the absence
of litigation, are continuous and decreasing in 2 ( /L) : Therefore, there exists a set of
e¤orts fe1 ( j Out; 2) 8 2 g for some 2 2 (0; 1) ; such that the potential infringer
expects zero prot from entering upon observing f /Lg : Thus there exists an equilibrium
fe1 ( j Out; 2) 8 2 g and f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g = fOut; 2g
for some 2 2 (0; 1).
Case 2: Assume that given the set of patent holder e¤orts fe1 ( j Out; In) 8 2 g ;
the infringer wishes to play f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g = fIn; Ing : Then by
f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g =2 ffOut;Outg ; fOut; Ing ; fIn; Ingg ;
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I know its expected prots from entry conditional on observing fLg are positive given
fe1 ( j Out; In) 8 2 g ; but negative given fe1 ( j In; In) 8 2 g : Thus by Lemma
4, the infringers second period expected prots from entry, after observing the absence of
litigation, are continuous and decreasing in 2 (L) : Therefore, there exists a set of e¤orts
fe1 ( j 2; In) 8 2 g for some 2 2 (0; 1) ; such that the potential infringer expects
zero prot from entering upon observing fLg : Thus there exists an equilibrium
fe1 ( j 2; In) 8 2 g and f2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)g = f2; Ing
for some 2 2 (0; 1).
Proof of Uniqueness:
Part 1: proving unique equilibrium best response for the infringer
Case PS: (Pure strategy equilibrium): Assume there exists an equilibrium with infringer
best responses:
f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g
such that
f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g 2 ffOut;Outg ; fOut; Ing ; fIn; Ingg (98)
Case PS.1: It cannot be the case that both fOut;Outg fOut; Ing are in equilibrium
because if fOut; Ing is an equilibrium, by Lemma 5 I know that the infringers expected
prots upon observing the f /Lg, are monotonically increasing as 2 ( /L)! 0: Therefore, it
cannot be the case that case that the infringer expects positive prots from entry upon
observing f /Lg when playing f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = fOut; Ing ; but also expect negative
prots from entry upon observing f /Lg when playing f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = fOut;Outg :
Case PS.2: It cannot be the case that both fIn; Ing fOut; Ing are in equilibrium
because if fOut; Ing is an equilibrium, by Lemma 4 I know that the infringers expected
prots upon observing fLg, are monotonically increasing as 2 (L) ! 0: Therefore, it
cannot be the case that case that the infringer expects negative prots from entry upon
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observing fLg when playing f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = fOut; Ing ; but also expect positive prof-
its from entry upon observing fLg when playing f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = fIn; Ing :
Case PS.3: It cannot be the case that both fIn; Ing fOut;Outg are in equilibrium
because if fIn; Ing is an equilibrium, by Lemma 4 I know that the infringers expected
prots upon observing f /Lg, are monotonically increasing as 2 (L) ! 0: Therefore, it
cannot be the case that case that the infringer expects positive prots from entry upon
observing f /Lg when playing f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = fIn; Ing ; but also expect positive prots
from entry upon observing f /Lg when playing f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = fOut;Outg :
Case MS: Mixed Strategy Best responses:
f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = ff^2; Ing ; fOut; 2gg (99)
for some ^2 and 

2 2 (0; 1)
It cannot be the case that ff^2; Ing ; fOut; 2gg are both in equilibrium for any ^2
and 2 2 (0; 1) ; because if f^2; Ing is in equilibrium, it must be the case that the in-
fringer expects positive entry prots upon observing fLg when playing f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g =
fOut; Ing and expects negative prots from entry upon observing fLg when playing
f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = fIn; Ing : Therefore since by Lemma 4 the infringers expected prots
from entry, upon observing f /Lg, are increasing as 2 ( /L)! 0, it cannot be the case that
the infringer is indi¤erent to entry, upon observing f /Lg ; for any 2 ( /L) < 1; when there
exists another equilibrium f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g = f^2; Ing.
Furthermore, I know that when there is a equilibrium in mixed strategies, there exists
only one entry probability 2 (h1) that makes the infringer indi¤erent upon observing h1;
because of the monotonicity of expected prots shown in Lemmas 4 and 5 (See Case 1
and 2 in the proof of existence above):
Part 2: Uniqueness of Patent Holder E¤ort:
Each patent holders choice of e¤ort is uniquely determined for any given best response
2 (L) ; 

2 ( /L) ( from (21)-(30)): Therefore, since there is only one equilibrium set of
best responses f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g (Shown in Part 1 of this proof); there exists only one
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equilibrium f^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)g ; fe1 ( j ^2 (L) ; ^2 ( /L)) 8 2 g such that the infringer is
prot maximizing according to their beliefs, and beliefs are consistent with the patent
holders equilibrium actions.
Proposition 2: There exists a non-empty region of the parameter space, prior beliefs
0 () ; and type spaces   R such that the equilibrium is reputational.
Proof: The equilibrium is reputational as long as the infringers action in period two
is conditional on the rst period outcome with positive probability. Therefore I must
nd the parameter space that excludes the two equilibrium two trivial equilibria. Recall
the infringers expected prots from (18):
IN ( /L; In) =
F  
Z
 ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In)) ( j /L) d +
Z
p (e2 ( j Out)) ( j /L) d
IN (L; In) = F  
Z
 ( j L) d
Therefore, for any IN ( /L; In), there exists a licensing fee F; such that
F <
Z
 ( j L) d (100)
F >
24 R  ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In)) ( j /L) d:::
  R p (e2 ( j Out)) ( j /L) d
35 (101)
Where  ( j L)  p (e

1( j 1; 1))0 ()R
2
p (e1( j 1; 1))0 () d
d (102)
Where  ( j /L)  (1  p (e

1( j 0; 0)))0 ()R
2
(1  p (e1( j 0; 0)))0 () d
(103)
and that will result in reputational equilibria. From Lemma 6, I know IN ( /L; In) >
IN (L; In) ; therefore, there always exists an F such that
F  
24 R  ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In)) ( j /L) d+R
p (e2 ( j Out)) ( j /L) d
35 > 0 (104)
F  
Z
 ( j L) d < 0 (105)
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whenever IN ( /L; In) > 0:
Proposition 3: In any reputational equilibrium, there exists  2 R such that rst
period e¤ort is decreasing in  if and only if  > :
Proof: From Lemma 1 I know
@e1

j2(L);2

/L

@
< 0 if and only if @ ()
@
< 0: Further-
more, from (50) I know
@ ()
@
= (106)
=
241 + 2 (L)  + 2 ( /L)
0@ p (e2 ( j Out)) + :::
  ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In))
1A  p (e2 ( j Out))
35 (107)
= 1 + 2 (L)    2 ( /L) ( + 1) p (e2 ( j In))  (1  2 ( /L)) p (e2 ( j Out)) (108)
furthermore, as  !1; p (e2 ( j In)) ; p (e2 ( j Out))! 1: Therefore,
lim
!1
@ ()
@
= 1 + 2 (L)    2 ( /L) ( + 1)  (1  2 ( /L)) (109)
=  (2 (L)  2 ( /L)) (110)
From Lemma 6, I know 2 ( /L) > 

2 (L) for all reputational equilibria. Therefore 

2 (L) 
2 ( /L) < 0; and  strictly positive implies.
lim
!1
@ ()
@
=  (2 (L)  2 ( /L)) < 0 (111)
therefore there exists  2 R such that for all  > ; @e

1

j2(L);2

/L

@
< 0:
Proposition 4: In any reputational equilibrium, there exists  2 R and 2 R such
that
e1() = 0;8
n
 j  >  or  < 
o
:
Proof: From Proposition 3, I know that as  !1
@ ()
@
!  (2 (L)  2 ( /L)) < 0 (112)
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Therefore, there exists a  2 R such that for all  > ,  () = 0; and therefore for all
types  > , e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)) = 0:
Furthermore, as  !  1; then p (e2 ( j In)) ; p (e2 ( j Out))! 0: Therefore,
lim
! 1
 () =  1 (113)
so there exists 2 R such that for all types  <,  () = 0 and therefore for all types
 <, e1 ( j 2 (L) ; 2 ( /L)) = 0:
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Appendix 2
Appendix 2.A: Tables
Parameters
  v v " Potential Authors
XLibris -0.71 -0.065 6.01 0.52 1.09 12,400
s2
^;Sim
(0.02) (0.004) (0.49) (0.29) (0.03) (1,100)
s2
^;Boot
(0.13) (0.019) (1.18) (0.42) (0.17) (5,300)
Table 2 (w/o stage 1 BHS variation), T=100 simulation runs
Parameters
  v v " Potential Authors
XLibris -0.64 -0.101 5.98 0.48 1.04 22,000
s2
^;Sim
(0.25) (0.065) (0.42) (0.49) (0.11) (7,300)
s2
^;Boot
(0.15) (0.230) (0.98) (0.31) (0.16) (13,000)
Table 3 (w/ stage 1 BHS variation), T = 100 simulation runs
Authors Welfare Titles Published
xLibris
POD 1,240,000 (540,000) 5229 (-)
Traditional 47,000 (84,000) 181 (144)
xLibris Change -1,193,000 5048
Market Change -2,220,000 8390
Table 4 (w/o stage 1 BHS variation), T = 100 simulation runs
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Authors Welfare Titles Published
xLibris
POD 2,100,000 (1,100,000) 5229 (-)
Traditional 1,700,000 (1,100,000) 514 (1200)
xLibris Change -1,400,000 4715
Market Change -2,600,000 8770
Table 5 (w/ stage 1 BHS variation), T = 100 simulation runs
Sales Stats w/o stage 1 BHS variation w stage 1 BHS variation
Mean 14.7 15.1
S.D(of Mean) 1.36 2.43
Table 6 (Summary Statistics for the B = 1000 bootstrap samples of size W = 1250)
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Appendix 2.B: Identication
In this section we demonstrate how the CDF of simulated POD sales is a¤ected by
changes in the estimated parameter values. In other words working through the intuition
of the claim that for some j > 0 and all j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g we have
n
Z(Salesi j bj + j;b j)o5229
i=1
6=
n
Z(Salesi j bj;b j +  j)o5229
i=1
;8  j 2 R4:
We will begin by showing how all variables have independent e¤ects when assuming
" = 0: Once this is done we can demonstrate how our choice of " has a unique impact
on the CDF of simulated POD sales.
Throughout we make the distinction between the CDF of sales for the entire popu-
lation of authors, and the CDF of POD sales. While the distribution of all authors sales
will have an impact on the resulting CDF of POD sales, we are exclusively concerned
with matching the CDF of POD sales to the observed CDF of POD sales in our data.
The Distribution of Expected Sales.
The value of  determines the minimum value of CDF of sales in the population(all
authors before publishing decisions). This will then govern the x intercept of the CDF
of POD author sales, since  determines the minimum value of expected sales for all
authors. Figure 5 shows the impact of a change in :
The value of  determines the acceleration of the CDF of expected sales towards 1. If
 = 0, the CDF converges immediately to 1. As we increase ; the CDF converges more
slowly along the x axis to 1. Figure 6 shows the impact of a change in  on the CDF of
POD sales.
However, we need to t the distribution of POD sales, not the CDF of all authors
sales. Therefore, we must consider the other parameters impact. The distribution of
expected sales of all authors is simply determined by the parameters governing the Pareto
distribution. In contrast, distribution of POD sales is determined by the conditional
distribution of expected sales, given that the author chooses POD. In a sense, we only
observe a portion of authors contained within a subspace of author types. The following
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thresholds delineate the subspace of authors types that will choose POD.
s (v) =
CPOD   v
RPOD
(B.1)
s () = inf

s j E (POD j t; )  E (TRDQi j t; ) > 0; 8Qi 2 Q
	
39 (B.2)
Figure 3 shows these boundaries in the type space S  V .
The Distribution of Vanity
The values of v and v; determine the intercept and the shape of the CDF of POD sales
at the lower end of the distribution. Consider v = k; and v = 0 : only authors with
expected sales expectation greater than some threshold
s (k) =
CPOD   k
RPOD
(B.3)
will publish using POD. Our depiction of type choices would then become a single hori-
zontal slice of Figure 3 at v = k. Therefore, in the absence of any noise, and with v = 0
, this will dene the x intercept of the CDF of observed POD sales such that:
inf fs j CDF (s) > 0g = min fs (k) ; eg (B.4)
Therefore, as v ! 1, s (k) ! e; thus the lower end of the CDF of POD sales
will have the same intercept as the population CDF (because with all potential authors
having the same vanity, and that vanity being su¢ ciently large, no potential author will
choose not to publish). As we decrease v we will eventually increase the x intercept,
and atten the CDF, because removing the lower end of sales expectations will make the
densities of observed POD sales more uniform (as we only observe an upper potion of
the Pareto distribution of expected sales, as low sales expectation authors choose not to
publish). Figure 7 illustrates this e¤ect below.
39Note that this threshold is independent of an authors vanity. The intution being that for resonable
approxiation of the CDF of POD sales, an author deciding between POD and traditional publishing
already has su¢ cient vanity to publish. In other words, the upper threshold must be above the lower
threshold, or no POD authors will be observed.
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Now consider an increase in v: Now some authors with lower sales expectations, but
higher vanity will be drawn into publishing with POD. This will create a inward bend in
the lower portion of the CDF and push a small portion of the CDF below s(k) dened
by equation B.3: Figure 8 illustrates this e¤ect below.
Notice that without noise, nothing will change the point where the CDF of observed
sales hits 100%, because without noise, the upper limit of observed sales is simply deter-
mined by the unique point in expected sales s such that
psRTra   C200 = psRPOD   CPOD
s =
C200   CPOD
p (RTra  RPOD)
The Variance of Noise: "
The value of "; determines the cuto¤ of the upper end of simulated sales: This is true
because as we increase "; the level of expected sales above which an author will choose
traditional printing (s(")) also increases, because an increase in " increases the expected
prot of POD sales relative to traditional publishing at all sales levels. This will move
the upper threshold s to the right. Consequently this change will shift the point where
the CDF of simulated POD sales gets close to 1 to the right. No other change in the
other parameters can have any impact on the upper bound of the CDF of POD sales.
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of a change in " on the boundaries in the type space
delineating optimal author choice. Figure 9 illustrates the impact on the CDF of POD
sales.
Potential Author Population Estimate  (b)
Fitting the CDFs of simulated to observed sales does not require the number of potential
authors (it does not appear in our objective function). For each simulation run t; the
estimate of the parameters bt results in a certain number of the n =10,000 potential
author simulants choosing to publish with POD. Let (bt) be the number of simulants
that choose to publish with POD, and N be the number of POD authors in the data.
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The estimated probability that a random potential author i drawn from the distributions
parameterized by bt then becomes
Prob

a(si; vi j bt) = POD = (bt)
n
:
Therefore, our estimate of the potential author population, denoted  (bt), is
 (bt) = n
(bt)N:
Consider an example using the data from xLibris with a sample of N = 5229 POD
authors. If we nd that the number of simulants that choose POD, once we have tted
parameter values b; is (bt) = 3243; then our potential author population estimate is
 (bt) = 10; 000
3243
5229 = 16; 123:
The Distribution of Vanity
In this section we discuss the distributional assumptions of vanity, and the implications
of other potential assumptions. Consider table C, which shows the results from using a
normal distribution of vanity.
Parameters
  v v " Potential Authors
xLibris -0.58 (0.83) -0.074 (0.066) 471(10.7) 155(76) .98 (0.29) 31,300 (24,900)
Table 7 (Normally distributed Vanity w/o stage 1 BHS variation), T=10 simulation runs
Parameters
Mass   v v " Potential Authors
 = :1 -0.61(0.05) -0.088(0.006) 5.91(0.33) 0.57(0.05) 1.00(0.02) 13,000(9,100)
 = :5 -0.81(0.12) -0.070(0.023) 6.32 (0.34) 0.63(0.09) 1.15(0.11) 29,000(14,000)
 = :9 -0.72(0.39) -0.091(0.007) 6.37(0.51) 0.63(0.23) 1.02(0.15) 130,000(108,000)
Table 8 (Log Normal Vanity with Mass Point  w/o stage 1 BHS variation), T=100
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 = 0  v v " Potential Authors
XLibris 0.0(-) -0.080(0.009) 5.38(0.41) 0.41(0.20) 1.29(0.13) 39,400(21,000)
Table 9 (Log Normal Vanity and  = 0 w/o stage 1 BHS variation), T=100
One consequence of using the normal distribution is that the estimate of potential
authors increases. Because the normal distribution is symmetric around the mean, a
larger fraction of simulated potential authors choose not to publish, because they had
insu¢ cient vanities to justify the xed costs of POD.
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Figure 11: Change in the CDF of simulated POD sales for an increase in :
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Figure 12: Change in the CDF of simulated POD sales for an increase in :
Figure 13: Change in the CDF of simulated POD sales for an increase in v:
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Figure 14: Change in the CDF of simulated POD sales for an increase in v:
Figure 15: Change in the CDF of simulated POD sales for an increase in ":
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